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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Sandra Wert-Ruiz, the operator of a check cashing and 
money remitting agency, appeals her conviction for taking 
part in a conspiracy to launder drug money in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 1956(h). The District Court gave a willful 
blindness charge--informing the jurors that they could 
convict Wert-Ruiz if they concluded that she had 
deliberately avoided learning that she was dealing with the 
proceeds of illegal activity and that the transactions were 
designed to conceal or disguise the nature or source of 
those funds. Wert-Ruiz argues on appeal that: (1) there was 
sufficient evidence to support a jury conclusion that she 
had actual knowledge of the illegal source of the laundered 
money, but not that she had willfully blinded herself to the 
funds' origin; and (2) the District Court therefore should 
not have given a willful blindness charge. We agree that 
there was sufficient evidence of actual knowledge, but note 
that the jury might have credited only portions of the 
government's evidence and concluded that willful blindness 
was afoot. Because there was sufficient evidence from 
which a jury could find willful blindness, we hold that the 
District Court properly charged the jury. We will therefore 
affirm Wert-Ruiz's conviction. 
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In reaching our conclusion, we reject Wert-Ruiz's subtle 
contention that so long as there is sufficient evidence of 
actual knowledge, a willful blindness charge is at all events 
inappropriate. Rather, we follow our holding in United 
States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999), that, 
assuming there to be sufficient evidence as to both 
theories, it is not inconsistent for a court to give a charge 
on both willful blindness and actual knowledge. This is so 
because, if the jury does not find the existence of actual 
knowledge, it might still find that the facts support a 
finding of willful blindness. In view of our conclusion, we 
need not reach the government's alternative contention that 
an erroneous giving of a willful blindness instruction is per 




Sandra Wert-Ruiz earned a medical degree in the 
Dominican Republic. In 1986, she and her husband, 
Franklin Ruiz, moved to the United States. Wert-Ruiz 
became a United States citizen in 1989. In 1991, Wert-Ruiz 
and her husband opened S&F Check Cashing and S&F 
Associates. S&F 's main office was in West New York, New 
Jersey, and was managed by Wert-Ruiz, while Franklin 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Wert-Ruiz makes a number of additional arguments that we dispose of 
summarily. She asserts that the prosecutor made improper remarks 
during closing arguments on rebuttal. Because Wert-Ruiz's trial attorney 
failed to object to these statements, we review them only for plain error 
and conclude that they fail to rise to that level. Wert-Ruiz also objects 
to 
other statements made in the rebuttal that allegedly implied that she 
and her counsel had colluded to produce false evidence at trial. Having 
reviewed the statements, we do not find a clear implication of such 
conduct. At all events, Wert-Ruiz's attorney objected, the District Court 
gave a cautionary instruction afterwards, and defense counsel did not 
request a further remedy. Under the circumstances, we find no 
constitutional error. We also conclude, contrary to Wert-Ruiz's 
arguments, that she was not prejudiced by the government's purported 
incorporation of evidence into leading questions and that the government 
did not improperly vouch for Angel Rayo's credibility and bolster his 
testimony. Finally, in light of the preceding, we conclude that there was 
not an accumulation of errors that combined to deprive Wert-Ruiz of a 
fair trial. 
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Ruiz managed a branch in Guttenberg, New Jersey. S&F 
Check Cashing only handled check cashing services, 
whereas S&F Associates provided additional services such 
as money orders, Western Union transmittals, bill 
payments, and phone card sales. Wert-Ruiz testified that 
the businesses were dealing with millions of dollars 
annually, which included moving thirteen million dollars 
through Western Union money transmittals and over 
twenty-one million dollars through check cashing activities 
in 1994 alone. 
 
In 1994, Wert-Ruiz's portion of the business became 
involved in laundering drug money. The conspiracy touched 
Wert-Ruiz through the business of money remitting, which 
is a legitimate financial service used to send funds from one 
country to another. In a typical money remitting 
transaction an individual gives cash to a remitting agency 
in one country with direction that an individual in another 
country be paid. The remitter contacts a similar agency in 
the transferee country, provides the name of the funds' 
intended recipient, and transmits the funds. The recipient 
then collects the money from the transferee agency. 
Because the funds entering the remitting system are in the 
currency of the transferor country while those paid out are 
in the currency of the transferee, the tangible moneys 
received by the transferor remitting agency are not sent 
directly to the end recipient. Instead, they are sold to 
parties who need that particular currency to conduct their 
business (such as importers in foreign nations) in exchange 
for the currencies needed to pay out the remittances. 
 
Money remitting provides an avenue for placing currency 
into the banking system, making it a mechanism through 
which illegally obtained funds (like those acquired through 
drug trafficking) may be laundered. False receipts generated 
to record false remitting transactions create a paper trail 
indicating that money sent abroad is "clean," when in fact 
the foreign agency gives the transferred funds to the drug 
traffickers. Transactions of this nature were at the heart of 
the case against Wert-Ruiz. While there were no allegations 
that Wert-Ruiz was in any way involved with the actual sale 
of illicit drugs, federal prosecutors contended that she was 
a participant in a conspiracy to use her business to launder 
drug money. 
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Wert-Ruiz's involvement with money launderers arose in 
connection with an ongoing operation of Fabio Castro and 
Angel Rayo, the owners of a money remitting service known 
as International Services. In addition to conducting 
legitimate transactions, International Services was 
laundering drug money. Because the volume of transfers 
handled by International Services was potentially large 
enough to attract the attention of law enforcement, Rayo 
sought another agency to handle money transfers and 
asked Wert-Ruiz to become an agent of International 
Services. According to the government's evidence, Wert-Ruiz 
participated in the money laundering conspiracy by 
generating false receipts designed to conceal transfers of 
money. Specifically, drug trafficking proceeds were delivered 
in cash form to Wert-Ruiz, who then prepared or directed 
the preparation of false remitting receipts. These efforts, in 
turn, created a paper trail that suggested that the money 
was entering the banking system through legitimate 
channels. 
 
After a time, Wert-Ruiz obtained her own license to 
function as a remitter, and began operating through a new 
corporation she formed named Latin American Services 
("LAS"). Wert-Ruiz continued to receive money acquired 
through drug trafficking--often packed inside of gym bags 
--and continued to prepare fraudulent receipts. 
 
At the time of trial, Castro was a fugitive. Rayo testified 
on behalf of the government under a plea agreement. Wert- 
Ruiz did not dispute that money had been laundered 
through her business, but she denied knowing anything 
about the other conspirators' intentions. The government 
presented evidence that Wert-Ruiz and her employees 
handwrote thousands of fictitious receipts for cash 
delivered to LAS that was supposedly going to individuals 
in the Dominican Republic. The government presented 
expert testimony that Wert-Ruiz attempted to disguise her 
handwriting in preparing these receipts. Investigators 
testified that out of a sample of well over one hundred 
receipts seized from Wert-Ruiz, they had been unable to 
find a single person identified on any of the receipts, 
indicating that the receipts were false. At trial, Wert-Ruiz 
testified that she had prepared the forged receipts from 
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actual receipts provided by International Services that 
purportedly reflected real transactions. These latter receipts 
were not produced at trial, and the government presented 
evidence that Wert-Ruiz had never admitted to writing the 
forged LAS receipts during interviews with law enforcement 
officials conducted after her arrest but before trial. 
 
Additional evidence established that the conspirators 
used codes in conducting phone conversations about 
aspects of the conspiracy. Though Wert-Ruiz was not privy 
to many of the codes, she knew that the conspirators used 
the word "tarjetas" (Spanish for "cards") to mean money, 
and she was aware of their practice of dropping zeros when 
discussing sums of money, thus describing $10,000 as 
$1,000. 
 
A jury convicted Wert-Ruiz of violating 18 U.S.C. 
S 1956(h) (conspiracy to commit money laundering).2 She 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The statute provides that "[a]ny person who conspires to commit any 
offense defined in this section . . . shall be subject to the same 
penalties 
as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the 
object of the conspiracy." Id. The relevant portion of the money 
laundering statute implicated by this clause is 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(1), 
which provides for liability for: 
 
       Whoever, knowing that the property involved in afinancial 
       transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful 
       activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such afinancial 
       transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified 
unlawful 
       activity-- 
 
       (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified 
       unlawful activity; or 
 
       (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of 
       section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or 
 
       (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-- 
 
       (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, 
the 
       ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
       activity; or 
 
       (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or 
       Federal law[.] 
 
The statute provides a list of offenses that qualify as "specified 
unlawful 
activity," among them the sale or distribution of controlled substances. 
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received a six-year prison sentence and filed a timely notice 
of appeal. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. S 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 




At trial, the District Court instructed the jury on the 
issue of willful blindness as follows: 
 
        When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact 
       is an essential part of an offense, such knowledge may 
       be established if a defendant is aware of a high 
       probability of its existence, unless she actually believes 
       that it does not exist. 
 
        So with respect to the issue of a defendant's 
       knowledge in this case, if you find from all the evidence 
       beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
       deliberately and consciously tried to avoid learning that 
       certain currency was the proceeds of some form of 
       illegal activity, and that the defendants deliberately and 
       consciously tried to avoid learning that the transaction 
       was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise 
       the nature, location, source, ownership or control of 
       the proceeds of the unlawful activity, you may treat 
       such deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge as the 
       equivalent of knowledge. 
 
        I must emphasize, however, that the requisite proof 
       of knowledge on the part of a defendant cannot be 
       established by demonstrating she was negligent, 
       careless or foolish. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
See id. S 1956(c)(7). Though knowledge that the funds have been 
obtained illegally is required, knowledge of what the specified unlawful 
activity is is not, for the statute defines "knowing that the property 
involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form 
of unlawful activity" as meaning that the person involved "knew the 
property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some 
form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a 
felony under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not 
such activity is specified in paragraph (7) [which defines the specified 
unlawful activities]." Id. S (c)(1)." 
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Wert-Ruiz argues that the government adduced evidence 
only of her actual knowledge of the conspiracy and its 
objects, and that there was insufficient evidence of willful 
blindness to allow a jury to conclude that she had 
deliberately avoided learning about the illegal activities for 
which her business was used. Because such evidence was 
absent, the argument continues, the instruction was 
unjustified, and had the effect of diluting the government's 
burden of proof by creating the risk of convicting Wert-Ruiz 
if the jury concluded that she merely should have known 
about the criminal activities. See United States v. Hilliard, 
31 F.3d 1509, 1517 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 
Our review of a challenge to the propriety of the willful 
blindness instruction is plenary. See United States v. 
Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999). In evaluating 
the charge, we view the evidence and the inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the government. 





A willful blindness instruction is often described as 
sounding in "deliberate ignorance." See United States v. One 
1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1994). Such 
instructions must be tailored, as the District Court's was 
here, to avoid the implication that a defendant may be 
convicted simply because he or she should have  known of 
facts of which he or she was unaware. Willful blindness is 
not to be equated with negligence or a lack of due care, see 
id. at 809 n.13, for "willful blindness is a subjective state of 
mind that is deemed to satisfy a scienter requirement of 
knowledge," id. at 808. The instruction"must make clear 
that the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the 
high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that 
a reasonable man would have been aware of the 
probability." United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 
(3d Cir. 1985). If such a charge is supported by sufficient 
evidence, it is not inconsistent for a court to give a charge 
on both willful blindness and actual knowledge, for if the 
jury does not find the existence of actual knowledge, it 
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might still find willful blindness. See United States v. 
Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Wert-Ruiz does not challenge the legal adequacy of the 
instruction as it was worded, but rather the propriety of 
giving it under the circumstances of her case.3 She urges 
that there was insufficient evidence of willful blindness to 




Wert-Ruiz concedes that there was sufficient evidence to 
convict her of knowingly participating in the conspiracy. As 
noted above, however, she maintains that none of the 
government's evidence supported a willful blindness 
instruction. Wert-Ruiz contends that each piece of the 
government's evidence can be interpreted in only one of two 
ways: either she was a knowing participant in the 
conspiracy (if the government's evidence is believed) or she 
was an unknowing innocent who became ensnared in it (if 
the government's evidence is not believed). Mindful that we 
must interpret each piece of evidence (and draw all 
supportable inferences) in favor of the government, and 
mindful that the jury was entitled to decide that only part 
of the government's evidence was credible, we conclude that 
Wert-Ruiz's challenge must fail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Wert-Ruiz does, however, make an additional legal challenge to the 
instruction. She argues that the instruction was error under the 
circumstances because it is impossible to be willfully blind to 
participation in a conspiracy. Citing United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 
1237 
(2d Cir. 1995), she maintains that it is "logically impossible for a 
defendant to intend and agree to join a conspiracy if [s]he does not know 
that it exists." Id. at 1243. This contention flounders on our ruling to 
the 
contrary in United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 1996), 
which affirmed a conspiracy conviction where "the jury had ample 
evidence with which to conclude that, at a minimum,[the defendant] 
had willfully blinded himself to the fact that" a criminal conspiracy 
existed. 
 






Wert-Ruiz first points to the testimony of Angel Rayo. At 
trial Rayo claimed to have recruited Wert-Ruiz to 
participate in illegal laundering activities. Rayo testified 
through an interpreter that he recruited Wert-Ruiz to pose 
as an agent of International Services by specifically asking 
her to engage in activities to support the "illegal aspects" of 
International Services' transactions, stating "I also propose 
is that she do appear as an agent where transfers would be 
done that were not real in order to support the illegal 
aspects of International Services." Rayo also testified that 
Wert-Ruiz subsequently generated false receipts for 
nonexistent money remitting transactions to create a paper 
trail that would make sending drug money abroad appear 
legal. 
 
Wert-Ruiz characterizes each of these portions of Rayo's 
testimony as evidence of actual knowledge, but not willful 
blindness. It is true that a jury could find from this 
evidence that Wert-Ruiz knew she was participating in a 
conspiracy to launder funds that had been generated by 
illegal activities. It is essential, however, to remember the 
precise contours of the instruction. The District Court 
specifically focused the willful blindness instruction on the 
source of the laundered funds and the purpose of the 
transactions in which she engaged. To be sure, the 
evidence recounted above, if believed by the jury, could 
have been used to conclude that Wert-Ruiz knew the illegal 
source of the money and the precise purpose of her 
activities. The evidence is not, however, inconsistent with 
the conduct of an individual who willfully blinded herself 
from the source of the funds with which she dealt and the 
nature of those activities. 
 
"Illegal aspects" (the wording employed by Rayo in his 
testimony) is a vague term, encompassing a range of 
activities that may not have involved the laundering of drug 
money. Wert-Ruiz could have knowingly generated the false 
receipts in exchange for the commissions she received while 
willfully blinding herself to the source of the cash or the 
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purpose of the transactions even if she knew her activities 
had "illegal aspects." Indeed, Rayo himself testified that he 
had been willfully blind about the funds that he was 
laundering for quite some time. When asked what he 
understood about the source of the funds, he stated"I 
never asked the question. The truth is I did not want to 
know." Similarly, Rayo testified that Wert-Ruiz never asked 
him about the source of the money that she would be 
transferring. A jury could have credited both Wert-Ruiz's 
denial of knowledge and the evidence of her participation in 
the concealment activities, concluding that the reason that 
Wert-Ruiz did not know of the source of the illicit funds 
was her deliberate ignorance of the circumstances 
surrounding her activities. Willful blindness instructions 
have previously been upheld under similar circumstances. 
See United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir. 
1996) (upholding willful blindness instruction where the 
defendants, who were charged with laundering drug money, 
failed to inquire about the source of the money and used 
incorrect names and addresses on documents when wiring 
money). 
 
In short, a jury could have credited Rayo's testimony as 
implying that Wert-Ruiz knew that she was being invited to 
engage in activities designed to conceal the source of 
certain moneys without being specifically told the source of 
the funds. The fact that Wert-Ruiz did not ask the natural 
follow-up question to determine the source of those funds 
could be reasonably considered by a jury to be evidence of 
willful blindness, especially when combined with the 
additional evidence discussed below. 
 
Finally, we must remember that the jury was entitled to 
disbelieve all or part of Rayo's testimony. Thus, even if we 
were to agree with Wert-Ruiz that Rayo's testimony only 
supports a finding of actual knowledge, there was other 
evidence in the record on which a jury could have relied to 
find that Wert-Ruiz had willfully blinded herself to the 




Wert-Ruiz points also to the testimony of Yuri Acosta, 
who testified that he delivered bags of money to Wert-Ruiz 
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and claimed that Wert-Ruiz advised him that, if he were 
ever caught with the funds, he should say that he was 
bringing money from International Services or another 
cashier. Wert-Ruiz claims that this is evidence of knowledge 
of illegality. Again, in our view, the evidence indicates 
knowledge of concealment, but is not exclusively evidence 
of knowledge of the illicit source of the money. In light of 
Wert-Ruiz's denial that she ever knew the illegal source of 
the funds, a jury could accept the denial and conclude that 
her conduct evidenced willful blindness. Further, as with 
Rayo's testimony, because the jury could selectively 
discredit some of the evidence in the prosecution's case, the 
existence of evidence that points to actual knowledge does 
not preclude consideration of other evidence that points to 
a finding that Wert-Ruiz was wilfully blind to the source of 




The ability of the jury to have discounted aspects of the 
government's case is important in light of the last piece of 
evidence that, according to Wert-Ruiz, demonstrates that 
her culpability was either knowing or innocent, but not 
deliberately ignorant. After Wert-Ruiz's arrest, she spoke to 
a customs agent who testified that Wert-Ruiz described her 
activities and admitted that she received bags of money in 
such large volume that she herself was suspicious about it. 
The agent testified that after he asked her if she thought 
the money came from the sale of narcotics, "[Wert-Ruiz] 
replied that she was an educated woman, and where else 
would money come from in that amount." 
 
This statement, if credited by the jury, would indeed 
suggest actual knowledge and not willful blindness. Still, in 
juxtaposition with Wert-Ruiz's claims at trial not to have 
known the source of the funds, it could arguably be viewed 
as an example of willful blindness--in other words, she 
never asked questions while participating in the conspiracy, 
but when the truth was revealed she was not at all 




Wert-Ruiz further claims that the government's 
summation confirms that the evidence previously recounted 
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pertained only to actual knowledge. We do not agree. She 
bases her argument on segments of the summation where 
the prosecution emphasized Rayo's testimony that he told 
Wert-Ruiz that she would be a pretend agent for 
International Services and the evidence that Wert-Ruiz 
created fake receipts for transactions that never took place. 
Again, we do not believe this evidence supports only an 
actual knowledge charge, as it could be taken to 
demonstrate either that Wert-Ruiz figured out that the 
funds with which she was dealing came from an illegal 
source or that she willfully avoided drawing that inference 
and therefore never "knew" that to be the case. Moreover, 
as Wert-Ruiz concedes, the government did indeed argue 
that even if the jury accepted some of the defendant's 
arguments, the evidence indicated that she still"clos[ed 




Even if some of the evidence discussed above tends to be 
consistent only with a finding of actual knowledge, the 
government presented ample additional evidence from 
which a reasonable inference of willful blindness could be 
drawn. The government points out that evidence was 
introduced demonstrating that Wert-Ruiz knew that in 
many of the transactions the co-conspirators would refer to 
large dollar amounts by dropping digits, but still she did 
not raise questions as to this practice. Similarly, there is 
evidence that she and members of the conspiracy would 
refer to money by the code word "tarjetas" (the Spanish 
word for cards). A reasonable jury, having discounted 
evidence of Wert-Ruiz's actual knowledge of the conspiracy 
or its objects, could rationally conclude that the practice of 
using code words for transactions and minimizing dollar 
amounts--not to mention her receipt of large amounts of 
cash in gym bags--must have alerted her to the possibility 
that her money transfer activities were actually in service of 
a money laundering operation, and that her failure to 
inquire further evinced willful blindness. This is not to say 
that Wert-Ruiz did not proffer alternative explanations, but 
the verdict indicates that the jury did not credit them. 
Because the evidence supports that verdict, we will not 
second guess that decision. 
 




Failing to uphold the District Court's instruction under 
these facts could carry harmful results. There was little 
direct evidence that Wert-Ruiz specifically knew that she 
was helping to launder the proceeds of illegal activity--most 
of the evidence in this regard was circumstantial. It would 
seem that a reasonable person could have drawn few other 
conclusions given the nature of the transactions, yet Wert- 
Ruiz claimed not to have known that she was engaging in 
money laundering activity. If Wert-Ruiz deliberately avoided 
learning the source of the funds, she could have honestly 
claimed to have lacked knowledge. In this light, a willful 
blindness instruction served the important purpose of 
preventing Wert-Ruiz from evading culpability if the jury 
concluded that due to a willful refusal to connect the dots, 
Wert-Ruiz actually did not know of the purposes of her 
money laundering activities. See United States v. Sharma, 
190 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 1999) (approving instruction 
when jury could have inferred the defendant's lack of 
knowledge, and the willful blindness instruction"ensured 
that a juror who believed that a defendant turned a blind 
eye toward his co-defendant's conduct would not vote to 
acquit the willfully blind defendant"). Deliberate ignorance 
cannot become a safe harbor for culpable conduct. 
 
In sum, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have 
concluded that Wert-Ruiz deliberately avoided learning 
about the source of the enterprise's funds. Because we so 
hold, there is no need to address the government's 
contention that the giving of a willful blindness instruction 
when there is insufficient evidence of the same is per se 
harmless error. The judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
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